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It is widely recognized that under imperfect competition ad valorem
and specific commodity taxes are non-equivalent in terms of welfare. This
paper provides a counter-example by developing a general equilibrium
model of Cournot/Bertrand oligopoly and monopolistic competition. We
show that if the specific tax rate exceeds its ad valorem equivalent,
welfare improves under the shift from specific to ad valorem taxes that
leaves the government revenue unchanged. In other words, the implication
under perfect competition survives all the market structures above.
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1 Introduction
Which is more efficient between ad valorem and specific (unit) taxes?
Under distortion-free perfect competition, both taxes are equivalent in the
sense that they lead to the same welfare.1) A similar result holds for a
shift from specific to ad valorem taxation that leaves the total tax revenue
unchanged. To be precise, the above tax reform raises welfare if and only
* Schol of Economics, Kwansei Gakuin University. Uegahara 1-1-155, Nishinomiya,
Hyogo, Japan. Tel: +81-798-54-7066. Fax: +81-798-54-0944.
E-mail: kenjifujiwara@kwansei.ac.jp.
1) See, for example, Stiglitz and Rosengard (2015, p. 546).
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if the initial level of specific tax rate is higher than its ad valorem equiva-
lent. However, it is almost impossible to find such a perfectly competitive
industry, and most industries are characterized by imperfect competition.
This paper examines the welfare effect of an increase in ad valorem tax
and a decrease in specific tax that keeps the government revenue constant in
three market structures; Cournot, Bertrand and monopolistic competition.
There is a large literature that compares the two taxes under imperfect
competition, but this paper differs from it in the following respects. First,
unlike the previous works, we use the same model to achieve the above
purpose. As we review below, the existing literature typically assumes a
partial equilibrium oligopoly model with a quasi-linear utility function and
a general equilibrium monopolistic cometition. In contrast, we develop a
unified model by assuming a continuum of industries, some of which are
subject to ad valorem taxes and the other of which are subject to spe-
cific taxes. Our modeling strategy greatly draws on Neary (2003, 2016).
Second, we pay special attention to the general equilibrium effect of tax-
ation. Third and most importantly, we show the equivalence between the
two tax forms in Cournot, Bertrand and monopolistic competition. In
other words, the implication under perfect competition is still useful under
imperfect competition as well.
While this paper is related to all sub-fields in public economics and in-
dustrial organization, we mention only two strands of literature that are
most closely related. The first related literature concerns the comparison
between ad valorem and specific taxation under imperfect competition. As-
suming a homogeneous Cournot model with/without free entry, Delipalla
and Keen (1992) show that the revenue-neutral tax shift from specific to
ad valorem taxes enhances welfare. This result is challenged by Anderson
et al. (2001) by allowing for product differentiation and Bertrand compe-
tition. They find that the specific tax is more efficient than the ad valorem
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tax under Bertrand competition.2)
The second strand of related literature owes to Neary (2003, 2016). As-
suming a continuum of oligopolistic industries and that firms are large in
their market but small in the economy as a whole, Neary (2003) examines
the effect of competition policy, and Neary (2016) examines the determi-
nant and welfare effect of international trade.3) Since Neary’s (2003, 2016)
approach is not only tractable but also overcomes the problems inherent
in general equilibrium oligopoly theory, it is increasingly applied mainly
to international trade.4) In contrast, we incorporate Cournot, Bertrand
and monopolistic competition into Neary’s model, and explore the welfare
implication of the revenue-neutral tax reform.
Our main result is that in Cournot, Bertrand and monopolistic compe-
tition the revenue-neutral tax reform improves welfare if and only if the
specific tax exceeds the corresponding ad valorem equivalent. In other
words, the result under perfect competition survives the above three types
of imperfect competition. We recognize that this finding rests on a number
of simplifying assumptions, it makes a certain contribution to literature in
the sense that the insight under perfect competition is useful even under
imperfect competition.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the model and
assumptions that are commonly employed in different market structures.
Sections 3, 4 and 5 examine the welfare effect of the revenue-neutral shift
from ad valorem to specific taxation in Cournot, Bertrand and monopolistic
competition, respectively. Section 5 concludes.
2) Keen (1998) is a survey on the comparison between ad valorem and specific taxa-
tion.
3) Colacicco (2015) provides a comprehensive survey on Neary’s (2003, 2016) model
and its application to international trade.
4) As far as I searched the Google Scholar, I found no paper that applies Neary’s
model to public economics (as of January 7, 2021).
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2 Model
This section constructs a base model that is common to all market struc-
tures we will consider. Suppose a continuum of goods on a unit interval



























where n(z) is the number of differentiated goods in industry z, pi(z) is
the price of variety i, xi(z) is the consumption of variety i, X(z) is the
quantity index of industry z, I is national income, and σ > 1 is the elasticity
of substitution among varieties.5) Solving this problem, the demand and



































a convenient relationship holds between P (z) and X(z) such that P (z)X(z) =
I. Substituting this relationship into the direct utility function (1), the in-


















under monopolistic competition, but we use the discrete version as in Dixit and
Stiglitz (1977) and Krugman (1980).
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This indirect utility function serves as a welfare measure in the subsequent
sections.
Having described the consumer behavior, let us turn to the firm behavior.
We assume that labor is a numeraire so that the wage rate is normalized
to unity. Each firm produces a (horizontally) differentiated good with
marginal labor requirement c > 0 and fixed labor requirement f ≥ 0. In
the existing literature that compares ad valorem and specific taxes, it is
customary to assume that both taxes are imposed on firms. In contrast, we
split the whole economy into a set of industries in which the ad valorem tax
is levied and a set of industries in which the specific tax is levied. Denoting
the threshold that separes these sets of industries by ez ∈ (0, 1), the firm
profit in each set of industries is defined by
pi(z)xi(z)
1 + t
− cxi(z) − f for z ∈ [0, ez] (7)
pi(z)xi(z) − cxi(z) − τxi(z) − f for z ∈ [ez, 1] , (8)
where t is the ad valorem tax rate and τ is the specific tax rate. In the fol-
lowing sections, we utilize this model to accomodate a Cournot oligopoly, a
Bertrand oligopoly and monopolistic competition to investigate the welfare
effect of the revenue-neutral shift from specific to ad valorem taxation.
3 Cournot Oligopoly
The present and next sections address the effects of taxation in Cournot
and Bertrand competition, respectively. Just for notational simplicity, we
assume that the fixed labor requirement is zero. Under Cournot oligopoly,
the first-order condition for profit maximization yields the following per-
firm output, industry-wide output and price:
x1 =
(σ − 1)(n − 1)I
(1 + t)σn2c
, nx1 =




(σ − 1)(n − 1) ,
(9)
for the industries on which the ad valorem tax is levied. Here, subscript 1
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represents the industry that is subject to ad valorem taxation. Similarly,
the counterparts of the industries the specific tax is imposed are obtained
as
x2 =
(σ − 1)(n − 1)I
σn2(c + τ)
, nx2 =




(σ − 1)(n − 1) ,
(10)
where subscript 2 represents the industry that is subject to specific taxa-
tion.
Based on the industry-wide outputs and prices in (9) and (10), we now
derive the national income. The definition of national income is









where the first term in the last equation is labor income, the second and
the third terms are the aggregate profits in the industries with ad valorem
and specific taxation, respectively, and T is the tax revenue. The per-firm







x1, π2 = (p2 − c− τ)x2, T =
ezntp1x1
1 + t
+(1 − ez) nτx2.
(11)
Substituting (9) and (10) into (11) and applying the resulting expressions




(σ − 1)(n − 1) ·
(1 + t)(c + τ)
ez(c + τ) + (1 − ez) (1 + t)c . (12)
This completes the full illustration of the Cournot model. Once I is deter-
mined in (12), we can obtain the other endogenous variables by substituting
(12) into them.
In the rest of this section, we will study the effects of the shift from spe-
cific to ad valorem taxation such that the total tax revenue T is unchanged.
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For this purpose, let us note that tax revenue T takes the form of6)
T =
L
(σ − 1)(n − 1) ·
ezσnt(c + τ) + (1 − ez) (σ − 1)(n − 1)(1 + t)τ
ez(c + τ) + (1 − ez) (1 + t)c . (13)
Totally differentiating this with respect to t and τ , the revenue-neutral tax
reform requires dT = (∂T/∂t)dt + (∂T/∂τ)dτ = 0, which is rewritten as
dτ = − ez(c + τ) {[ez(σ + n − 1) + (σ − 1)(n − 1)] τ + σnc}
(1−ez) (1+t)c {[ez(σ+n−1) + (σ−1)(n−1)] t + (σ−1)(n−1)}dt.
(14)
Since the coefficient of dt is negative, the specific tax rate must be lowered
(dτ < 0) if the ad valorem tax rate is raised (dt > 0) and the government
revenue is kept constant. In the analysis below, we focus on this case; the
opposite case can be analyzed just by reversing the sign of dt and sτ .
We are now ready to examine the welfare effect of the above tax reform.
Recalling that the indirect utility function is
W = ln I − ez ln P1 − (1 − ez) ln P2,
where P1 and P2 are the price indices in the industries in which ad valorem




1−σ (1 + t)c
(σ − 1)(n − 1) , P2 =
σn
2−σ
1−σ (c + τ)
(σ − 1)(n − 1) .
Substituting these price indices and (12) into the indirect utility function
above and rearranging terms, welfare is shown to depend on the two tax
rates as follows.
W = (1−ez) ln(1+t) + ez ln(c + τ)−ln [ez(c + τ) + (1−ez) (1 + t)c] + const.
(15)






− ez ln c.
By relating the rule of the revenue-neutral tax reform (14) to (15), we
establish:
6) The derivation of (13) is as follows. Subsituting (12) into (9) and (10) yields the
outputs and prices as a function of t and τ . Further substitution of them into T
in (11) leads to (13).
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Proposition 1. The revenue-neutral shift from specific to ad valorem
taxation raises welfare if and only if the specific tax rate (τ) is higher than
the corresponding ad valorem equivalent (tc), i.e.
sign{dW} = sign{(τ − tc)dt}. (16)
Proof. Totally differentiating (15) with respect to t and τ and substituting



















where the terms in the parentheses are
ez (1 − ez) (τ − tc)




ez (1 − ez) (tc − τ)
(c + τ) [ez(c + τ) + (1 − ez) (1 + t)c]
| {z }
∂W/∂τ
× −ez(c + τ) {[ez(σ + n − 1) + (σ − 1)(n − 1)] τ + σnc}





(1 + t)c [ez(c + τ) + (1 − ez) (1 + t)c] B ,
where A and B are given by
A = ez {[ez(σ + n − 1) + (σ − 1)(n − 1)] τ + σnc}
+(1 − ez) c {[ez(σ + n − 1) + (σ − 1)(n − 1)] t + (σ − 1)(n − 1)} > 0
B = [ez(σ + n − 1) + (σ − 1)(n − 1)] t + (σ − 1)(n − 1) > 0.
As a result of these lengthy manipulations, we reach (16). ||
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4 Bertrand Oligopoly
This section turns to Bertrand competition in which firms choose the
price. The analysis in this section is motivated by Anderson et al. (2001).
In a Hotelling model of Bertrand duopoly with asymmetric marginal costs,
they show that specific taxation welfare-dominates ad valorem taxation.
Then, they claim that ‘This argument (weakly) suggests that it is primarily
the mode of competition that isesponsible for the result.’ (p. 243) In this
section, we reexamine this conclusion of Anderson et al. (2001) by checking
the validity of Proposition 1 in a Bertrand oligopoly.
Since the procedure of solving the model and examining the welfare effect
of tax reform is the same as that of the previous section, we will shorten the
argument to the necessary extent. The profit of each firm is given by (7)
and (8) under the demand functions (4). Solving the first-order conditions
for profit maximization yields
p1 =
(σn − σ + 1)(1 + t)c
(σ − 1)(n − 1) , nx1 =
(σ − 1)(n − 1)I
(σn − σ + 1)(1 + t)c , (17)
for the goods on which the ad valorem tax is levied. Similarly, the coun-
terparts for the goods on which the specific tax is levied are
p2 =
(σn − σ + 1)(c + τ)
(σ − 1)(n − 1) , nx2 =
(σ − 1)(n − 1)I
(σn − σ + 1)(c + τ) . (18)
Substituion of these prices and industry outputs into (11), and further
substitution of the resulting expression into the definition of I lead to
I =
(σn − σ + 1)L
(σ − 1)(n − 1) ·
(1 + t)(c + τ)
ez(c + τ) + (1 − ez) (1 + t)c . (19)
This completes the description of our Bertrand model. As in the Cournot
model, all the endogenous variables such as prices and outputs are derived
by substituting (19) into them.
Having derived the Bertrand equilibrium, let us examine the welfare
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effect of the revenue-neutral shift from specific to ad valorem taxation.
Relating the equilibrium prices and outputs in (17) and (18) to (11), the
total tax revenue turns to depend on the two taxes as follows.
T =
L
(σ − 1)(n − 1) ·
ez(σn−σ + 1)t(c + τ) + (1−ez) (σ−1)(n−1)(1+ t)τ
ez(c + τ) + (1 − ez) (1 + t)c .
(20)
Totally differentiating (20) with respect to t and τ , the revenue-neutral tax
reform dT = 0 has the rule
dτ = − ez(c + τ) {[ezn + (σ − 1)(n − 1)] τ + (σn − σ + 1)c}
(1 − ez) (1 + t)c {[ezn + (σ − 1)(n − 1)] t + (σ − 1)(n − 1)}dt. (21)
Nore here that as in the Cournot model the specific tax must be lowered
if the government is to raise the ad valorem tax and the tax revenue is to
be unchanged.7)
In order to assess the welfare effect of the above tax reform, we now
compute welfare as a function of the two tax rates. The indirect utility
function is a function of the national income I in (19) and two price indices,




1−σ (σn − σ + 1)(1 + t)c
(σ − 1)(n − 1) , P2 =
σn
1
1−σ (σn − σ + 1)(c + τ)
(σ − 1)(n − 1) ,
in the Bertrand case. Then, we have the closed form of welfare
W = (1− ez) ln(1+ t) + ez ln(c + τ)− ln [ez(c + τ)+(1− ez) (1+ t)c] + const.
(22)






− ez ln c,
by subtituting I, P1 and P2 into the indirect utility function. Relating the
tax reform rule (21) to this welfare measure, we obtain the following result.
Proposition 2. Proposition 1 holds in Bertrand competition as well. That
is, the revenue-neutral shift from specific to ad valorem taxation raises wel-
fare if and only if the specific tax rate (τ) is higher than the corresponding
7) This follows from the fact that the coefficient of dt in (21) is negative.
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ad valorem equivalent (tc).
Proof. Our proof is the same as the proof of Proposition 1. Totally dif-
ferentiating (22) with respect to t and τ and substituting (21) into the
resulting expression give rise to
dW =
ez(τ − tc)C
(1+t)c [ez(c+τ)+(1−ez) (1+t)c] {[ezn+(σ−1)(n−1)] t+(σ−1)(n−1)}dt,
where C is given by
C = ez {[ezn + (σ − 1)(n − 1)] τ + (σn − σ + 1)c}
+(1 − ez) c {[ezn + (σ − 1)(n − 1)] t + (σ − 1)(n − 1)} > 0.
Thus, we have proved the proposition. ||
5 Monopolistic Competition
Thus far, we have addressed the welfare effect of the tax reform in
oligopolies in which the number of firms is exogenously fixed. In con-
trast, this section turns to monopolistic competition. As is well-known,
monopolistic competition is different from restricted entry oligopolies in
the sense that (i) the number of active firms is endogenously determined
by the zero profit condition, and (ii) each firm takes the quantity and price
indices as given in choosing output/price. Despite these differences, we
will show that Propositions 1 and 2 survive this market structure.
The model is the most primitive version of Dixit and Stiglitz (1977).8)
8) Melitz (2003), which has a revolutionary impact on the trade literature, introduces
firm heterogeneity. Krugman (1979), Behrens and Murata (2007) and Zhelobodko
et al. (2012) abandon the assumption of CES preferences to generate a variable
markup, which has been empirically reported. It is beyond the scope of this paper
to take into account of these extensions of the Dixit-Stiglitz model since they
considerably complicates the analysis. However, it may be possible to utilize the
model of Parenti et al. (2017) that compares the solution of (free entry) Cournot,
Bertrand and monopolistic competition.
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Solving the first-order condition for profit maximization, the zero profit
condition, and the market-clearing condition for each variety, the price,






















Since fee entry derives the firm profit to zero, national income consists
of labor income and tax revenue:
I = L + T = L + ez
tp1nx1
1 + t










Solving this equation for I yields the closed form of national income:
I =
σ(1 + t)(c + τ)L
σ [ezτ + (1 − ez) tc + c] + (1 − ez) (1 + t)τ . (25)
As is the case of the Cournot and Bertrand models, all the endogenous
variables are obtained by substituting (25) into the relevent variables.
Let us now compute the tax revenue as an auxiliary step to examining
the welfare effect of the revenue-neutral tax reform. Making use of Eqs.
(23)-(25), T becomes
T =
[ezσt(c + τ) + (1 − ez) (σ − 1)(1 + t)τ ] L
σ [ezτ + (1 − ez) tc + c] + (1 − ez) (1 + t)τ . (26)
By totally differentiating (26) with respect to t and τ and invoking the rule
of the revenue-neutral tax reform 0 = dT = (∂T/∂t)dt + (∂T/∂τ)dτ , we
get
dτ = − ezσ(c + τ)
2
(1 − ez) (σ − 1)(1 + t)2cdt. (27)
Having derived the policy reform rule, we will consider its welfare ef-
fect. As repeatedly stressed, the biggest difference between monopolistic
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competition and restricted entry oligopolies lies in whether the number of
firms is endogenous or exogenous. Noting this, the closed form of the price







1−σ (1 + t)σc






1−σ σ(c + τ)
σ − 1 .
Substituting these price indices and (25) into the indirect utility function,
welfare takes the form
W = ln I − ez ln P1 − (1 − ez) ln P2







1−σ (1 + t)σc
σ − 1
)












σ − 1 ln I −
ezσ
σ − 1 ln(1 + t) − (1 − ez) ln(c + τ) + const.
(28)
where const. = − 1





− ez ln c.
Based on the preceding arguments, the welfare effect of the revenue-neutral
shift from specific to ad valorem taxation is summarized as follows.
Proposition 3. Proposition 1 holds in Bertrand competition as well. That
is, the revenue-neutral shift from specific to ad valorem taxation raises wel-
fare if and only if the specific tax rate (τ) is higher than the corresponding
ad valorem equivalent (tc).
Proof. Notice first that I in (28) is unchanged under the revenue-neutral
tax reform because of the definition of national income, I = L + T ; if T
is unchanged, I is also unchanged. Accordingly, the suggested tax reform
affects welfare through the second and third terms in (28). Taking this
fact into account and totally differentiating (28) with respect to t and τ ,
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(σ − 1)(1 + t)2cdt,
by utilizing (27). Therefore, the right-hand side of this equation allows us
to find that the tax reform raises welfare if and only if τ − tc > 0. ||
6 Concluding Remarks
It is generally believed that perfect competition is so far from the real-
ity that the insight under perfect competition is useless. This paper has
provided a counter-example to tackle this claim in a context of comparison
between ad valorem and specific taxes. Concretely, we show that under
Cournot, Bertrand and monopolistic competition the revenue-neutral shift
from specific to ad valorem taxation raises welfare if and only if the specific
tax rate is higher than the corresponding ad valorem equivalent. We also
note that the general equilibrium model with a continuum of industries
plays a key role behind this result.
The primary purpose of this paper is not to pursue the generality of
the model, but we must recognize the limitations of our analysis. First,
we assume a traditional approach in which firms are homogeneous. How-
ever, it is now standard to introduce firm heterogeneity a la Melitz (2003).
Second, we have employed a CES -sub-utility function under which the
markup is constant. Although this considerably facilitates analysis, re-
cent developments of imperfect competition theory stress the importance
of variable markup by abandoning the CES assumption. For example,
quadratic preferences are used in Ottaviano et al. (2002) and Melitz and
Ottaviano (2008), CARA (constant absolute risk aversion) preferences are
used in Behrens and Murata (2007) and more general preferences are used
in Zhelobodko et al. (2012). As far as we know, there is little literature in
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public economics that takes into account firm heterogeneity and/or non-
CES preferences. It is important future research agenda to check our result
in a more general and realistic setting.
参考文献
[1] Anderson, Simon P. de Palma, Andre Kreider, Brent, 2001. ”The effi-
ciency of indirect taxes under imperfect competition,” Journal of Public
Economics, Elsevier, vol. 81(2), pages 231-251
[2] Delipalla, Sofia Keen, Michael, 1992. ”The comparison between ad valorem
and specific taxation under imperfect competition,” Journal of Public Eco-
nomics, Elsevier, vol. 49(3), pages 351-367
[3] Behrens, Kristian Murata, Yasusada, 2007. ”General equilibrium models of
monopolistic competition: A new approach,” Journal of Economic Theory,
Elsevier, vol. 136(1), pages 776-787
[4] Rudy Colacicco, 2015. ”Ten Years Of General Oligopolistic Equilibrium: A
Survey,” Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 29(5), pages
965-992
[5] Dixit, Avinash K Stiglitz, Joseph E, 1977. ”Monopolistic Competition and
Optimum Product Diversity,” American Economic Review, American Eco-
nomic Association, vol. 67(3), pages 297-308
[6] Michael Keen, 1998. ”The balance between specific and ad valorem taxa-
tion,” Fiscal Studies, Institute for Fiscal Studies, vol. 19(1), pages 1-37
[7] Krugman, Paul R., 1979. ”Increasing returns, monopolistic competition,
and international trade,” Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol.
9(4), pages 469-479
[8] Krugman, Paul, 1980. ”Scale Economies, Product Differentiation, and the
Pattern of Trade,” American Economic Review, American Economic As-
sociation, vol. 70(5), pages 950-959
[9] Marc J. Melitz, 2003. ”The Impact of Trade on Intra-Industry Realloca-
tions and Aggregate Industry Productivity,” Econometrica, Econometric
Society, vol. 71(6), pages 1695-1725
— 15 —
経済学論究第 75 巻第 1 号
[10] Marc J. Melitz Gianmarco I. P. Ottaviano, 2008. ”Market Size, Trade,
and Productivity (DOI:10.111/j.1467-937x.2007.00463.x),” Review of Eco-
nomic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 75(3), pages 985-985.
[11] Neary, P. J. 2003, ‘The Road Less Traveled: Oligopoly and Competition
Policy in General Equilibrium,’ in Arnott, R., B. Greenwald, R. Kanbur
and B. Nalebuff (eds), Economics for an Imperfect World: Essays in Honor
of Joseph E. Stiglitz, Cambridge, MA, MIT Press, pp. 485-500.
[12] J. Peter Neary, 2016. ”International Trade in General Oligopolistic Equi-
librium,” Review of International Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 24(4),
pages 669-698
[13] Gianmarco Ottaviano, Takatoshi Tabuchi and Jacques-Francois ThisseAg-
glomeration and Trade Revisited International Economic Review Vol. 43,
No. 2 (May, 2002), pp. 409-435
[14] Mathieu Parenti Alexander V. Sidorov Jacques-Francois Thisse Evgeny V.
Zhelobodko, 2017. ”Cournot, Bertrand or Chamberlin: Toward a recon-
ciliation,” International Journal of Economic Theory, The International
Society for Economic Theory, vol. 13(1), pages 29-45
[15] Evgeny Zhelobodko Sergey Kokovin Mathieu Parenti Jacques ‐ Francois
Thisse, 2012. ”Monopolistic Competition: Beyond the Constant Elastic-
ity of Substitution,” Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 80(6), pages
2765-2784
— 16 —
